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Trusting Courts with 
Arbitration Provisions 
Stephen E. Friedman† 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court does not trust courts when it comes to 
arbitration provisions. The Court has constructed a jurisprudence that 
almost entirely eliminates judicial discretion in deciding whether to 
enforce an arbitration provision and makes enforcement nearly auto-
matic. Employers and larger companies have taken advantage of the 
situation by routinely inserting class-arbitration waivers and other re-
strictions on collective action in their arbitration provisions. Because 
plaintiffs are not able to join together to pursue their rights, their claims 
effectively go unresolved and individuals are left with claims but no 
meaningful ability to remedy them. Arbitration provisions function 
more like exculpatory clauses than as reasonable efforts to fairly resolve 
disputes. 
This Article argues that the Court has misconstrued the Federal 
Arbitration Act and that the Act was never intended to limit judicial 
discretion in this way. Courts should be able to consider the impact of 
enforcement of an arbitration provision on the ability of a party to 
pursue other important contractual, common-law, and statutory claims. 
This proposition might seem unremarkable but it is largely foreclosed 
by the Court’s current jurisprudence. This Article endeavors to dis-
mantle the faulty underpinnings of the current jurisprudence and re-
establish meaningful judicial control over the enforcement of arbitration 
provisions. 
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Introduction 
The Supreme Court has severely diminished judges’ discretion in 
deciding whether to enforce pre-dispute arbitration provisions. These 
provisions, in which parties agree that they will arbitrate disputes that 
later arise between them, are ubiquitous.1 In recent years, the Court 
has given these provisions something close to blanket approval, even in 
cases when they function like exculpatory clauses that prevent con-
sumers and small businesses from being able to meaningfully pursue 
their rights. The Court has reduced state and federal courts to the mere 
muscle of the operation—the mindless enforcers of arbitration pro-
visions. But courts have more than just brawn. They also have brains 
and a heart. In passing the United States Arbitration Act,2 now known 
as the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), in 1925, Congress intended 
courts to use all three. 
It is particularly important that courts use their brains and their 
hearts when it comes to arbitration provisions that permit only indi-
vidual arbitration by requiring waiver of a party’s ability to join with 
other plaintiffs in a collective proceeding, such as class-wide arbitration. 
 
1. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stack 
ing-the-deck-of-justice.html [http://perma.cc/XNL5-F22M] (reporting that 
“[o]ver the last few years, it has become increasingly difficult to apply for a 
credit card, use a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop online 
without agreeing to private arbitration. The same applies to getting a job, 
renting a car or placing a relative in a nursing home”); Consumer Fin. 
Protection Bureau, Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Prot. Act § 1028(a) 9 (2015) 
(reporting to Congress the results of a study finding that “[t]ens of millions 
of consumers use consumer financial products or services that are subject to 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses”). 
2. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) 
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)). 
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If such waivers were imposed outside of an arbitration provision they 
would almost certainly be struck down, but when they are included in 
an arbitration provision courts routinely enforce them. When such arbi-
tration provisions are enforced, they serve not as paths to an alternative 
and efficient form of dispute resolution, but instead as dead ends for 
millions of consumers and small businesses. 
The Supreme Court has brushed aside concerns about the impact 
that enforcing these arbitration provisions has on the more vulnerable 
party in a transaction. In one case, the Court enforced an arbitration 
provision that barred class-wide arbitration even though the consumer 
claims were worth only about $30 per consumer.3 The Court was cav-
alier about the possibility that the bar on class-wide relief would result 
in small-dollar claims slipping through the cracks of the legal system.4 
In another case, the Court enforced a class-arbitration waiver in an 
antitrust claim.5 The Court did so even though the plaintiffs, restaurant 
owners suing American Express, had established that the cost of the 
expert report needed to maintain the case exceeded the likely recovery 
any individual plaintiff would receive from a successful verdict.6 The 
fact that the claim could not realistically or practically be brought on 
an individual basis did not move the Court, which was satisfied by the 
fact that a plaintiff could still technically make its claim, despite it not 
being rational for any individual plaintiff to do so.7 
Not surprisingly, the consequence of these decisions has been an 
increase in the use of arbitration provisions that limit or totally elim-
inate the right of the plaintiffs to maintain a class-wide or other collec-
tive proceeding. As Justice Ginsburg recently wrote in a dissenting 
opinion, it “has become routine, in large part due to this Court’s de-
cisions, for powerful economic enterprises to write into their form 
contracts with consumers and employees no-class-action arbitration 
clauses.”8 And in its 2015 report to Congress on arbitration provisions 
in the consumer financial product and services industries, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) found that “[a]lmost all of the 
arbitration clauses studied contained terms limiting the availability of 
class proceedings in arbitration.”9 
 
3. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 (2011). 
4. See infra Part II.B.1. 
5. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235–39 (2013). 
6. Id. at 231.  
7. See infra Part II.B.2. 
8. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
9. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 1, at 44 (2015). The study 
provides that “93.9% of the credit card arbitration clauses, 88.5% of the 
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Of course, a legislative fix is possible. On July 10, 2017, the CFPB 
announced a new rule that would have limited the impact of arbitration 
provisions on class actions involving consumer financial products and 
services.10 The rule would have prohibited a provider of such products 
and services from relying on pre-dispute arbitration provisions for the 
dismissal or stay of a class action concerning financial products or serv-
ices.11 However, President Donald Trump recently signed a measure re-
pealing this rule.12 Repeal of this rule makes the judicial fix proposed in 
this Article all the more crucial. And even if the rule had survived, it 
would have been a blunt and suboptimal approach. It should be open 
to parties to craft or utilize rules that provide for collective action and 
protect the rights of the parties even if the procedures crafted fall short 
of class-wide arbitration. The CFPB rule would have squelched inno-
vation. In contrast, an approach that gives meaningful—but not un-
limited—discretion to courts to assess arbitration provisions by em-
powering courts to consider the impact of enforcement would provide 
flexibility, foster arbitration, and protect the rights of the parties. This 
Article argues for such an approach. 
The key to establishing the propriety and desirability of such an 
approach is to first dismantle the underpinnings of the Court’s current 
jurisprudence. To begin with, there is a great deal of irony in the Court 
so completely disregarding the impact enforcement of an arbitration 
provision will have on the effectiveness of remedies for other claims. 
One key driving force behind the FAA was the need to ensure the 
availability of a meaningful remedy—not merely a technical one—for 
breaches of arbitration agreements. 13  Congress presumably did not 
 
checking account arbitration clauses, 97.9% of the prepaid card arbitration 
clauses, 88.7% of the storefront payday loan arbitration clauses, 100.0% of 
the private student loan arbitration clauses, and 85.7% of the mobile wireless 
arbitration clauses” in the sample reviewed by the CFPB contained 
provisions that “expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed on a class 
basis.” Id. 
10. See CFPB Issues Rules to Ban Companies From Using Arbitration 
Clauses to Deny Groups of People Their Day in Court, Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau (July 10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/cfpb-issues-rule-ban-companies-using-arbitration-clauses-
deny-groups-people-their-day-court/ [https://perma.cc/NN4R-TW8S]. 
11. See 82 Fed. Reg. 137, 137 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
1040) (summarizing the CFPB’s findings in its 2015 report). 
12. See Trump Signs GOP Repeal of Consumer Banking Rule, N.Y. Times 
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2017/11/01/us/politics/ 
ap-us-trump-consumer-rule.html [https://perma.cc/3TSR-J2FL] (reporting 
that the President signed the repeal on November 1, 2017). 
13. See infra notes 31–41 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative 
history of the FAA).  
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intend to ensure a meaningful remedy for breaches of arbitration pro-
visions at the expense of meaningful remedies for other claims. This im-
portant component of the FAA’s heritage has become buried in the 
Court’s current jurisprudence. This Article seeks to recover and honor 
that heritage. The Court’s current jurisprudence, involving a single-
minded focus on enforcing arbitration provisions regardless of the im-
pact on other rights brings to mind President Lincoln’s defense of the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil War. 
He asked: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”14 We might 
ask in the context of this Article whether all the statutory, common 
law, and contractual rights should go without vindication lest an arbi-
tration provision go unenforced. 
The current jurisprudence is built on a number of misunder-
standings of the purpose and history of the FAA as well as of its 
language. This Article seeks to expose those misunderstandings and to 
argue for a more appropriate approach to the judicial role in enforcing 
arbitration provisions. The Supreme Court should place more faith in 
the ability of courts to decide whether and how to enforce arbitration 
provisions. Specifically, courts should be permitted to consider the im-
pact that enforcement of an arbitration provision would have on a par-
ty’s ability to obtain relief for other claims. Permitting courts to weigh 
this consideration is fully consistent with the FAA but is, perhaps 
surprisingly, largely foreclosed by the Court’s current arbitration-
protecting jurisprudence. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth some background 
on the FAA, including its history, purpose and structure. Part II de-
scribes the Court’s current outcome-ignoring jurisprudence. Part III is 
the heart of the Article. It explains the many false premises and errors 
that undergird the Court’s jurisprudence on arbitration provisions. 
With incorrect premises set aside and proper ones substituted in their 
place, this Article explains a more appropriate approach to the role of 
the courts in enforcing arbitration provisions. That approach, an appli-
cation of the generally applicable rules for granting specific performance 
for breach of contract, is set forth in Part IV. 
I. History, Purpose, and Structure of the FAA 
The law before the passage of the FAA and the other modern 
arbitration statutes placed pre-dispute arbitration provisions in a hazy 
netherworld. A number of idiosyncratic rules undermined the effective-
ness of these provisions. The first of these rules was the “rule of revoca-
bility.” The second rule barred courts from granting specific perfor-
 
14. Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 The Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
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mance for breach of arbitration provisions. Under this second rule, 
courts could neither grant a motion to compel arbitration nor stay liti-
gation of issues that were subject to a valid arbitration clause. 
Under the rule of revocability, either party to a pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreement could revoke the agreement any time before the arbi-
trators issued their award.15 A New York court in 1855 observed that a 
pre-dispute arbitration provision was “a mere authority [granted to the 
arbitrators by the parties], revocable by either party, at any time before 
the case is finally submitted to the arbitrators for decision, subject only 
to liability for damages.”16 An 1871 decision by New York’s highest 
court also illustrates the rule. In Wood v. Lafayette,17 the court held 
that an arbitrator’s determination was not binding on the parties be-
cause, before the arbitrator had made his decision, one of the parties 
had revoked the arbitrator’s authority.18 The court explained that the 
arbitrator’s “power so to act [as an arbitrator] was revocable by either 
party, as is the case in every submission to arbitrators, if exercised at 
the proper time.”19 The court concluded that “his power having been 
revoked, his subsequent determination was not binding on the par-
ties.”20 An 1858 opinion provided some justification for the rule: “Arbi-
trators being selected, not by law but by the parties themselves, there 
is danger of some secret interest, prejudice or bias in favor of the party 
making the selection; and hence the opposite party is allowed, to the 
latest moment, to make inquiries on the subject.”21 
The legislative history of the FAA also includes discussion of the 
rule of revocability. Julius Henry Cohen, a principal drafter of the 
FAA22 and a key driving force behind and advocate for the FAA,23 
 
15. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
16. Smith v. Compton, 20 Barb. 262, 267 (1855). 
17. 46 N.Y. 484 (1871).  
18. Id. at 490. 
19. Id. at 489–90. 
20. Id. at 490. 
21. Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858). 
22. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008) 
(identifying Julius Henry Cohen as one of the primary drafters of the FAA); 
Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1939, 1947 (2014) (describing Cohen as “the chief draftsman 
of the FAA”). 
23. See Imre Szalai, Outsourcing Justice: The Rise of Modern 
Arbitration Laws in America 42 (2013) (“Cohen played a central role 
in the enactment of modern arbitration laws”). Szalai’s book provides an 
excellent overview of the effort to pass the FAA. 
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noted in his testimony in the joint committee hearings that a party 
could even begin arbitration proceedings and if struck by a “hunch” 
that things were not going well, could simply withdraw from the agree-
ment.24 No other type of contract was subject to this very unusual 
“rule.” 
Other idiosyncratic rules also undermined the effectiveness and 
usefulness of arbitration provisions by withholding meaningful relief for 
breach of such provisions. Courts could award monetary damages, typi-
cally nominal, but lacked the authority to grant specific performance 
for this particular type of contract—an anomaly in the world of contract 
law. Haggart v. Morgan,25 an 1851 decision, illustrates the lack of an 
effective enforcement mechanism to remedy breaches of arbitration 
agreements. In Haggart, the court affirmed the lower court’s refusal to 
bar litigation even though the issue being litigated was covered by the 
arbitration agreement.26 The motion for nonsuit had been properly 
overruled “because the agreement to arbitrate only entitled the party 
to damages, but was no bar to an action.”27 The same court observed a 
few years later that “[i]t is well settled that courts of equity will never 
entertain a suit to compel parties specifically to perform an agreement 
to submit to arbitration.”28 The Restatement (First) of Contracts also 
stated that although arbitration provisions were not deemed invalid or 
improper, courts could not grant specific performance to enforce them.29 
Similarly, it stated that a party could not assert the existence of an 
arbitration provision as a bar to litigation commenced by the other 
party.30 
Concerns about these limitations on the ability of courts to render 
a meaningful—as opposed to merely technical or nominal—remedy for 
breach of an arbitration agreement are found throughout the FAA’s 
 
24. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 
and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th 
Cong. 14 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry 
Cohen). 
25. 5 N.Y. 422 (1851). 
26. Id. at 427. 
27. Id. 
28. Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491, 496 (1858). 
29. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 550 (Am. Law Inst. 1932). 
30. See id. (stating that under the law before the adoption of the modern 
arbitration statutes that an agreement to arbitrate is not a “bar to an action 
on the claim to which the bargain relates”); see also William F. Walsh, 
A Treatise on Equity § 64, at 323 (Callaghan & Co. 1930) (describing 
the law before the modern arbitration laws as permitting a party to pursue 
a lawsuit to final judgment and satisfaction “though in violation of his 
contract to arbitrate.”). 
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legislative history. The Senate Report notes that arbitration provisions 
were valid prior to the passage of the FAA, but that the only remedy 
for breach of such a provision was an award of money damages.31 The 
Senate Report then describes the “ancient”32 rules described above, 
noting that “the performance of a written agreement to arbitrate would 
not be enforced in equity”33 and that an arbitration provision could not 
be asserted as a bar to litigation or as a basis for a stay of proceedings.34 
Courts were “without power to grant equitable relief.”35 
This lack of judicial power to grant equitable relief had been a con-
cern for Congress since the beginning of debate on the bill. During the 
1923 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee Hearing, Senator Thomas Walsh 
of Montana stated: “Really, the purpose of this statute is to overcome 
the rule of equity, that equity will not enforce and [sic] arbitration 
agreement? That is really the purpose of it, is it not?”36 Given this state 
of the law, agreements to arbitrate were, the Senate Report notes, “in 
large part ineffectual, and the party aggrieved by the refusal of the 
other party to carry out the arbitration agreement was without ade-
quate remedy.”37 
The legislative history of the FAA, though sparse, is straight-
forward about the statute’s purpose. The House Report states that the 
FAA’s purpose was “to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbi-
tration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce.”38 The 
FAA, the House Report further notes, “declares simply” that arbi-
tration agreements “shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the 
Federal courts for their enforcement.”39 The FAA moved arbitration 
provisions from the limbo in which they existed into the world of 
“normal” contract law. As the House Report states, arbitration agree-
ments are, and should be treated as, “purely matters of contract.”40 The 
 
31. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 6 (1923) 
(documenting question asked during the Statement of Charles L. 
Bernheimer). 
37. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
38. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
39. Id. at 2. 
40. Id. at 1. 
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effect of the FAA is “simply to make the contracting party live up to 
his agreement,” thus placing an agreement to arbitrate “upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”41 
The FAA is not a long or overly complicated statute. The Supreme 
Court has described Section 2 of the FAA as the statute’s “primary 
substantive provision”42 and as its “centerpiece provision.”43 Section 2 
provides that written arbitration provisions in contracts in maritime 
transactions or interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”44 
While Section 2 effectuates the statute’s purpose of ensuring that 
arbitration provisions “shall be enforced,” the rest of the statute “pro-
vides a procedure” for their enforcement.45 Sections 3 and 4 set forth 
the procedures and mechanisms to be used for the grant of equitable 
relief for breach of an agreement to arbitration.46 The language of these 
sections is crucial and has been seized on by the Court to bolster its 
view that the FAA largely strips courts of discretion and calls for 
something approaching mandatory enforcement. The Court, as will be 
discussed, reads each appearance of the word “shall” in these sections 
as though it says “must.” That, however, is an error. As discussed later 
in this Article, the language is designed to establish a procedure and 
empower courts.47 
Section 3 provides the necessary authority for a court to stay litiga-
tion of a matter that is subject to arbitration. Under that section, if 
such litigation is commenced, the court “shall on application of one of 
the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been 
had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”48 Section 4 is a 
longer section and provides that a party may petition a court for an 
order directing that: 
 
 
41. Id. 
42. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
43. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985). 
44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (indicating that the FAA provides 
that arbitration provisions “shall be enforced” and that the Act “provides a 
procedure” for enforcement). 
46. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2012). 
47. See infra Part III.C. 
48. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
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arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the arbitration] 
agreement. Five days’ notice in writing of such application shall 
be served upon the party in default. . . . The court shall hear 
the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the 
agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court shall 
make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and 
proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within [an 
appropriate district].49  
The section also states that if an issue is raised as to the making of 
the arbitration agreement “the court shall proceed summarily to the 
trial thereof.”50 Assuming the court determines that the arbitration 
agreement was made, Section 4 provides that “the court shall make an 
order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration 
in accordance with the terms thereof.”51 The FAA also provides a pro-
cedure for the court to name an arbitrator if necessary52 and empowers 
the arbitrators to summon attendance by a witness and provides the 
procedure for so doing.53 
Section 9 of the FAA provides for the entry of a judgment by a 
court upon the arbitration award. This section provides the procedure 
and timeline and directs that in appropriate circumstances the court 
“must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or 
corrected.”54 Section 10 provides the narrow grounds upon which an 
arbitration award may be vacated.55 Section 11 gives courts the ability 
 
49. Id. § 4. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. § 5. 
53. Id. § 7. 
54. Id. § 9. 
55. Id. § 10 (providing for the award to be vacated if “procured by corruption, 
fraud, or undue means,” if there was “evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators,” if various types of misconduct on the part of the arbitrators 
occurred or if the arbitrators “exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made”). The Supreme Court articulated an 
additional ground for vacating an arbitration award when the arbitrators 
show manifest disregard for the law. The current status of that doctrine is 
uncertain. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
672 n.3 (2010) (declining to definitively address whether the doctrine is still 
valid). 
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to modify or correct an award of arbitration, again in narrow circum-
stances.56 
Having set forth some of the history and the basic structure of the 
FAA, this Article now turns to the Supreme Court’s current juris-
prudence on the role of courts in enforcing arbitration provisions. 
II. The Impact-Disregarding Jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court 
This Section of the Article focuses on the current impact-
disregarding approach to arbitration enforcement illustrated most 
clearly in the Supreme Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion57 and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.58 
Before discussing those key cases, this Article lays out some of the 
building blocks of the current jurisprudence. Section II.A begins with 
what the Court has called the “straightforward”59 cases and other cases 
that flesh out the meaning of Section 2’s statement that arbitration 
provisions are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”60 
Section II.B sets forth the key cases of Concepcion and Italian Colors. 
A. “Straightforward” Cases and the “Saving Clause” 
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will tolerate no rule that 
categorically bars arbitration of a particular type of claim. In Southland 
Corp. v. Keating,61 the Court addressed a California legal doctrine 
under which the California Supreme Court had interpreted a provision 
of a state statute to mean that certain claims brought by convenience 
store franchisees had to be subject to judicial consideration. 62 The 
United States Supreme Court held that the refusal to enforce an arbi-
tration provision in this context was inconsistent with the FAA. 
Congress, according to the Court, “mandated the enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements.” 63  The blanket prohibition on arbitration of 
claims under the California statute was not a ground that existed “at 
 
56. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2012) (giving court discretion to modify or correct an award 
in specified circumstances). 
57. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
58. 570 U.S. 228 (2013). 
59. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
60. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
61. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
62. Id. at 10. 
63. Id. 
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law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” and so was fore-
closed by the FAA.64 The barrier to arbitration in this case did not 
sound in contract law. The law at issue may not have exactly been the 
rule of revocability, but it was similar in many relevant respects. The 
rule at issue permitted a party to avoid an arbitration provision for 
reasons having nothing to do with contract law and presumably out of 
a belief that only a court could reach a just determination. The Court’s 
decision was correct. A few years later, the Court would describe as fol-
lows the situation at issue in Southland as the quintessential easy case 
under the FAA: “When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of 
a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The con-
flicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”65 
Things get more difficult beyond the so-called “straightforward 
cases.” A continuing controversial issue is which legal doctrines a court 
may apply in deciding whether to enforce an arbitration provision. As 
noted, Section 2 makes arbitration provisions “valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”66 This section has been referred to as the 
“saving clause.” The Court first described it as such in Prima-Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing.Co.,67 a 1967 decision. The 
Court in Prima-Paint observed that the “saving clause” indicates that 
Congress’ intent in 1925 was “to make arbitration agreements as en-
forceable as other contracts, but not more so”68 and to ensure that 
arbitration provisions not be elevated above other types of contracts.69 
In Perry v Thomas,70 the Court gave a narrow reading to the saving 
clause.71 In Perry, the Court held that the FAA preempted a California 
law that provided that actions for collection of wages could be brought 
in court despite the existence of an arbitration agreement.72 The case 
 
64. See id. at 10–11 (noting that the FAA’s “broad” principle of enforceability 
is not subject to limitations beyond those set forth in the Act). 
65. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011); see also 
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012) (per 
curiam) (holding that a West Virginia rule that barred enforcement of 
arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts where the claim involves 
negligence resulting in personal injury was inconsistent with and displaced 
by the FAA). 
66. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
67. 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
71. Id. at 490–91. 
72. Id. 
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thus falls within the category of straightforward cases in that it involved 
a legislative effort to nullify all arbitration agreements related to a par-
ticular type of claim. The Court’s dicta, however, further restricts the 
role of the courts by limiting the grounds that courts can use in as-
sessing arbitration provisions. The Court indicated that it was open on 
remand for the former employee to establish that the arbitration agree-
ment was an unconscionable and unenforceable contract of adhesion.73 
However, the Court gave a caution. First, it emphasized the word 
“any,” noting that arbitration provisions were valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable as a matter of federal law “save upon such grounds as exist 
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”74 The Court con-
tinued, noting that “state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, 
is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”75 In contrast, 
any state law principle taking its meaning “precisely from the fact that 
a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this require-
ment.”76 The Court further cautioned the court below that courts can-
not construe arbitration provisions differently from how they construe 
non-arbitration agreements under state law.77 “Nor,” the Court cau-
tioned, “may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate 
as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be un-
conscionable.”78 
The Court built on this dicta in subsequent cases in a way that 
further reduced the body of law applicable to arbitration provisions. In 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson,79 the Court expounded 
on the limited scope of applicable state law. According to the Court, 
under Section 2, states may “regulate contracts, including arbitration 
clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate 
an arbitration clause ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.’”80 The Court continued by warning 
that:  
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough 
to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair 
enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any 
 
73. Id. at 492 n.9. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 493 n.9. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
80. Id. at 281 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
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such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place 
arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” directly contrary to 
the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.81  
The Court in both cases focused on the reference to “any contract,” in 
both instances choosing to emphasize the word “any.” 
It was in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto82 that the Court 
most clearly delineated the grounds a court could consider in deciding 
whether to enforce an arbitration agreement. Casarotto involved a 
Montana law that made arbitration provisions unenforceable unless no-
tice of such a provision was “typed in underlined capital letters on the 
first page of a contract.”83 Although the law seems innocuous enough—
it was not hostile to arbitration, but merely recognized the importance 
of such provisions and sought to ensure knowledge of them—the Court 
held that it was inconsistent with and displaced by the FAA.84 As it 
had in earlier cases, the Court stressed the word “any” in Section 2. 
The Court observed that Section 2 provides that arbitration provisions 
in writing “‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.’”85 The Montana rule, according to the Court, was not applicable 
to any contract, but only to arbitration provisions.86 The Court pro-
vided crucial guidance, however, stating that “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be 
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening” 
Section 2.87 In a later decision, the Supreme Court provided a crucial 
further limitation. The Court held that not only may courts consider 
only fraud, duress, and unconscionability88 but also mandated that 
those doctrines not be applied in a way that disfavors arbitration.89 
This Article turns to the development of this extreme limitation now. 
 
81. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). 
82. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
83. Id. at 683. 
84. Id. at 688. 
85. Id. at 686 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
86. See id. at 688. 
87. Id. at 687. 
88. The Court has not explicitly said that these are the only three broadly 
applicable grounds that a court can consider, but it has never mentioned 
any others. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
89. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2011). 
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B. Culmination of the Court’s Approach to Arbitration 
The two cases most fully embodying the Supreme Court’s single-
minded focus on enforcement of arbitration provisions in accordance 
with the exact terms set forth in the arbitration agreement and the 
Court’s accompanying disregard for the consequences of enforcement of 
arbitration provisions are Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant. 
These two cases reduce judicial discretion in enforcement of arbitration 
provisions nearly to the vanishing point. This Section of this Article 
explores the Court’s reasoning in each of these cases. 
1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Concepcion added a new layer of protection from courts for arbitra-
tion provisions. While prior cases had permitted courts to apply only a 
handful of contract doctrines to arbitration provisions, the Court in 
Concepcion introduced new restrictions on how a court can apply those 
doctrines. After Concepcion, such doctrines can be applied only in such 
a way as to not disfavor arbitration. 
Concepcion involved an agreement for the sale and servicing of cell 
phones by AT&T.90 The agreement included an arbitration provision 
but required that claims be brought only in the customers’ “individual 
capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class 
or representative proceeding.”91 Customers filed a suit against AT&T 
alleging that the company had engaged in false advertising and fraud 
for charging sales tax on phones that AT&T had advertised as free.92 
AT&T filed a motion to compel arbitration and the customers re-
sponded that the arbitration was unconscionable and improperly excul-
patory because it prohibited any sort of class action.93 The district court 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had agreed with the custom-
ers.94 These decisions were consistent with California case law in which 
class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion involving small 
dollar amounts had been found unconscionable. This California rule ap-
plied whether arbitration or litigation was involved.95 For the Ninth 
Circuit, California precedent on this point was a “refinement of the 
unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in Cali-
fornia.”96 Accordingly, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, the FAA did 
 
90. Id. at 336. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 337. 
93. Id. at 337–38. 
94. Id. at 338. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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not preempt California’s application of its well settled unconscionability 
rule.97 
The Supreme Court saw it differently. The Court noted that what 
it referred to as the “Discover Bank rule”98 had been applied “fre-
quently” by California courts to find arbitration agreements un-
conscionable.99 The Court observed, first, that the case before it was 
not the type of straightforward case in which a state law provides a 
blanket prohibition of arbitration of a particular type of claim. Those 
type of cases, as discussed earlier,100 are easy for the Court and in such 
cases the “conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”101 Concepcion was 
not this type of an “easy” case because it did not involve a blanket pro-
hibition on arbitration. Additionally, the doctrine that the courts had 
applied in Concepcion was unconscionability, a well-established and 
broadly applicable contract law doctrine and one that the Court had 
previously approved as an appropriate ground for a court to consider.102 
The district court, therefore, would seem to have acted within the pa-
rameters set by the Supreme Court when it refused to enforce the arbi-
tration agreement. 
The Concepcion Court was not satisfied. The Court expressed 
concerns that courts could use a seemingly neutral doctrine like uncon-
scionability in a way that undermined arbitration. A court could dis-
criminate against arbitration by declaring unconscionable arbitration 
agreements that did not provide for judicially monitored discovery, or 
that disallowed arbitration agreements that did not involve ultimate 
disposition by a jury.103 The Court saw the case as one in which a 
facially neutral doctrine—unconscionability—had been applied in a way 
that disfavored arbitration by requiring class-wide procedures.104 The 
Court addressed the situation by adding another layer of protection for 
 
97. Id.  
98. Id. The doctrine took its name from the California Supreme Court opinion 
that had applied California’s unconscionability doctrine to find an 
arbitration provision that included a class action waiver was unconscionable 
in certain contexts. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 
(Cal. 2005). 
99. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340. 
100. See supra Part II.A. 
101. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341. 
102. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (noting that 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements 
without contravening § 2” of the FAA). 
103. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341–42. 
104. Id. at 341. 
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arbitration provisions that significantly restricted the manner in which 
generally applicable contract defenses could be applied to arbitration 
provisions. The Court based this new restriction on the preemption doc-
trine. 
The preemption doctrine, under which federal law preempts state 
law, flows from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. That clause 
makes federal law “the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in 
the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”105 In 
assessing questions of preemption, “the purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”106 One of the ways that 
preemption can occur is when the state law in question “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”107 The Court’s analysis in Concepcion focused 
on this form of preemption. 
To determine whether Congress’ purposes and objectives in passing 
the FAA were thwarted by the Discover Bank rule, the Court had to 
first identify the FAA’s purposes and objectives. The Court determined 
the “overarching purpose of the FAA” from the text of Sections 2–4.108 
That purpose, according to the Court, “is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings.”109 
The Court based its analysis primarily on the language of the stat-
ute. It stated that the FAA’s “principal purpose” of “ensur[ing] that 
private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms”110 
was “readily apparent from the FAA’s text.”111 The Court stated: 
Section 2 makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable” as written (subject . . . to the saving clause); §3 
requires courts to stay litigation of arbitral claims pending 
arbitration of those claims “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement”; and §4 requires courts to compel arbitration “in 
 
105. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
106. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1228, 1297 (2016) (quoting 
Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)). 
107. Id. (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 
(2000)). 
108. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. 
109. Id. Jodi Wilson discusses this supposed “streamlined proceedings” purpose 
of the FAA in a fine article on the topic. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme 
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 91, 124–31 (2012). 
110. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
111. Id. 
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accordance with the terms of the agreement” [upon the making 
of a proper motion].112 
This language, according to the Court, was intended to give parties dis-
cretion in designing arbitration provisions as they see fit “to allow for 
efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”113 As 
discussed later, the Court badly mischaracterizes the language of 
Section 2.114 
The Court held that the application of the unconscionability doc-
trine by the California courts as reflected in the Discover Bank rule was 
inconsistent with the FAA because it “interferes with arbitration” by 
allowing parties to demand class-wide arbitration. 115  This type of 
arbitration, the Court noted, “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbi-
tration—its informality.”116 The resulting procedures are typically slow-
er, more costly,117 and more procedurally complex and formal than indi-
vidual arbitration.118 Additionally, class arbitration increases the risk of 
a large judgment being entered against a defendant, a particular danger 
given the relatively limited grounds for appeal from a judgment.119 
The need to police judicial discretion flowed from the Supreme 
Court’s deep-seated suspicion of the motives of other courts when it 
comes to enforcing arbitration agreements. The Court justified its suspi-
cion by noting that the FAA was enacted “in response to widespread 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” 120  Examples of courts 
twisting facially neutral doctrines to the detriment of arbitration are 
not “fanciful” according to the Court, because “the judicial hostility 
towards arbitration that prompted the FAA had manifested itself in ‘a 
great variety’ of ‘devices and formulas’ declaring arbitration against 
public policy.”121 Further, the Court noted that “although these statis-
tics are not definitive, it is worth noting that California’s courts have 
been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than 
other contracts.”122 
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See infra Section III.B. 
115. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346. 
116. Id. at 348. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 349. 
119. Id. at 350–51. 
120. Id. at 339. 
121. Id. at 342 (citations omitted). 
122. Id. 
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Concepcion did not completely foreclose the possibility that courts 
could exercise at least some of their traditional discretionary role and 
take into account the likely impact of specific enforcement of an arbi-
tration provision on a party. The Court in Concepcion noted that even 
though the consumers could not maintain a class arbitration and would 
have to arbitrate on an individual basis, this did not mean that their 
small dollar claim would “slip through the legal system.”123 The ar-
bitration provision in Concepcion called for payment of a minimum of 
$7,500 plus double a consumer’s attorneys’ fees if a consumer obtained 
an award in arbitration greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.124 
The consumers were thus arguably better off with the arbitration agree-
ment than they would have been as class-action participants. As Justice 
Scalia noted, the claim at issue “was most unlikely to go unresolved.”125 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that had there truly been no realistic 
possibility that the claim could be brought, the Court might have ruled 
differently. At the very least, as Professor David Horton noted in the 
aftermath of Concepcion, given the $7,500 payment and attorneys’ fees 
provision at issue, the case “need not stand for the proposition that 
courts must compel individual arbitration even when doing so would 
kill off otherwise viable claims.”126 The Court wasted little time in de-
ciding a case that does stand for that proposition. The next Section 
discusses that case.  
2. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
Italian Colors involved an antitrust claim that could only plausibly 
be brought on a class-wide basis. It thus addressed the question that 
had not been fully present in Concepcion: What happens when a con-
tractual waiver of class-wide arbitration makes it almost certain, as a 
practical matter, that a claim will not be brought at all? The Court 
held that even though the cost of individually arbitrating a federal stat-
utory claim exceeded the potential recovery, the class waiver portion of 
the arbitration provision had to be enforced. This was true even though 
the claim at issue was a federal statutory claim.127 
In Italian Colors, merchants who accepted American Express 
charge cards sued American Express for violations of federal antitrust 
statutes. The merchants claimed that American Express had misused 
 
123. Id. at 351. 
124. Id. at 351–52. 
125. Id. at 352. 
126. David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State 
Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1272 (2013). 
127. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 235–37 (2013). 
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its monopoly power to force the merchants to pay unduly high fees.128 
The agreement between the merchants and the credit card issuer in-
cluded an agreement that disputes between the parties were to be re-
solved by arbitration and that disclaimed any “right or authority for 
any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” 129  American 
Express moved to compel individual arbitration based on the language 
in the contract.130 
The merchants responded to the motion by pointing out that the 
cost of the expert economic analysis necessary to establish their anti-
trust claim would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, while 
the maximum recovery an individual merchant could expect to receive 
was less than $40,000.131 As a technical matter, nothing would prevent 
the filing of an individual action. However, the likelihood of such an 
action being brought was effectively zero. 
Italian Colors gave the Court a chance to flesh out the “effective 
vindication” doctrine. This doctrine had offered some promise that the 
consequences of enforcement of an arbitration provision would be con-
sidered, at least with respect to claims involving alleged violations of 
federal statutes. Unfortunately, the Court took the opportunity to 
interpret this doctrine in an extremely narrow fashion. 
The effective vindication doctrine is a judicially created exception 
to the FAA. Under this exception, a court can invalidate an arbitration 
agreement that prevents the effective vindication of a federal statutory 
claim.132 The doctrine has been mentioned by the Supreme Court on a 
few occasions, but the Court has never applied the doctrine to invali-
date an arbitration agreement. The Court first mentioned the doctrine 
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.133 That 
case repudiated earlier jurisprudence that had questioned the appli-
cation of the FAA to the arbitration of statutory claims.134 The Court 
in Mitsubishi Motors found no presumption against arbitration of stat-
utory claims in the FAA and no reason to depart from the FAA’s pro-
 
128  Id. at 231.  
129. Id. at 232 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting In re Am. Express 
Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 209 (2d. Cir. 2012)). 
130. Id. at 231. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 235. 
133. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
134. Id. at 626–27. For example, in Wilko v. Swan, the Court had held that the 
FAA did not require an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the 
Securities Act of 1933 to be enforced and that the statutory claims were 
more appropriately subject to resolution by litigation as opposed to 
arbitration. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
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arbitration policy when it came to statutory claims.135 A party that 
agrees in advance to arbitrate a statutory claim “does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”136 So long as 
there was no basis in the text of the statute or in the legislative history 
to show Congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies, 
the federal statutory claim should be subject to arbitration if the parties 
had so agreed.137 
The Court did, however, provide some caution about the arbi-
trability of federal statute claims. The Court noted that “[this] is not 
to say that all controversies implicating statutory rights are suitable for 
arbitration.”138 But “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral form, the [federal] 
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent func-
tion.”139 Where the cause of action cannot be effectively vindicated in 
the arbitral forum the arbitration provision presumably ought not be 
enforced. The doctrine, at least in principle, seemed like a promising 
route to assess the impact of enforcement of an arbitration provision, 
at least in the case of federal statutory claims. But the doctrine has not 
lived up to its initial promise. 
The Court has given some additional insight into the doctrine’s 
scope. In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 140 the 
court noted that prohibitive expense in bringing a claim could be a ba-
sis to refuse enforcement of an arbitration agreement so long as the par-
ty seeking to avoid arbitration provides adequate evidence.141 Prior to 
the Court’s decision in Italian Colors, however, the Court had not 
addressed the breadth of the doctrine. 
Although it did affirm the doctrine’s validity, the Court in Italian 
Colors applied the doctrine in a cramped manner. The Court began its 
analysis by laying the now familiar foundation, stating that the FAA 
was enacted in response to “widespread judicial hostility”142 to arbitra-
tion and that courts “must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements 
 
135. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 426.  
136. Id. at 628. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 627. 
139. Id. at 637. 
140. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
141. Id. at 92. 
142. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2013). 
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according to their terms.”143 The Court went on to refuse to extend the 
effective vindication doctrine to the facts before it. The Court focused 
on the “right to pursue” statutory remedies, not the practicalities of a 
party actually being able to maintain a claim and resolve it through 
arbitration.144 For the Court, something as extreme as a provision in an 
arbitration agreement “forbidding the assertion of certain statutory 
rights” would satisfy the effective vindication exception.145 Beyond that, 
though, the Court was stingy in its dicta. Even the existence of “filing 
and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to 
make access to the forum impracticable” would not make a clear case 
for the Court, as it indicated that the doctrine would only “perhaps” 
cover such a situation.146 With access-restricting fees only “perhaps” 
qualifying as one of the category of cases warranting application of the 
effective vindication doctrine, the plaintiffs in Italian Colors never stood 
a chance. The Court held that “the fact that it is not worth the expense 
of proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the 
right to pursue that remedy.” 147  The Court noted that before the 
adoption of the class action procedure, individual suits were considered 
sufficient to effectively vindicate statutory rights. So, although the class 
waiver made the maintenance and prosecution of the action practically 
and virtually impossible, the right to pursue the claim still existed.148 
A forceful dissenting opinion by Justice Kagan focused on the prac-
tical implications of the majority opinion. The procedural bars in the 
arbitration provision made the pursuit of the antitrust claim a “fool’s 
errand.”149 American Express, the dissent noted, had insulated itself 
from liability and effectively deprived the plaintiffs of their legal re-
course.150 In a stark passage, the dissenting opinion continued: “And 
here is the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted rath-
er than camouflaged: Too darn bad.”151 
The consequences of cases like Concepcion and Italian Colors are 
unsurprising. As Justice Ginsburg wrote in a dissenting opinion a few 
years after these two cases, it “has become routine, in large part due to 
 
143. Id. at 233 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 
(1985)). 
144. Id. at 235–36. 
145. Id. at 236.  
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 236–37. 
149. Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
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this Court’s decisions, for powerful economic enterprises to write into 
their form contracts with consumers and employees no class-action 
arbitration clauses.”152 And as noted in the Introduction, the CFPB re-
ported a striking prevalence of class-action waivers in arbitration pro-
visions in the consumer financial product and service market.153  
The Court’s jurisprudence on arbitration, particularly as illustrated 
in Concepcion and Italian Colors, has placed arbitration provisions in 
bubble wrap, immune from all but the narrowest of grounds of attack. 
Most significantly, this jurisprudence has turned these provisions into 
terms that either prevent any realistic possibility of a claim being 
brought at all or that fail to ensure that a meaningful remedy be avail-
able for any other type of claim. This is not what Congress intended or 
envisioned. The next Part of the Article exposes the fundamental 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations that undergird the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
III. Dismantling the Premises of the Court’s 
Jurisprudence 
The Court has ignored the FAA’s history and purpose and has read 
into it things that simply are not there. The FAA’s jurisprudence is 
wrong for a number of reasons. Section A discusses the key and crucial 
irony of enforcing breaches of arbitration agreements at the expense of 
enforcement of all other types of claims—a strange turn given that the 
FAA is premised on ensuring that a claim carry a meaningful remedy. 
Section B argues that the FAA should not be seen as a Congressional 
effort to constrain courts but rather to empower them. Section C ex-
plores two crucial ways in which the Court has misread the language of 
the FAA. Section D discusses the Court’s flawed saving clause analysis. 
And Section E argues that the preemption analysis that underlies the 
Court’s most recent restrictive jurisprudence misconstrues the purpose 
of the FAA. 
A. The FAA’s Heritage on Meaningful Remedies 
The FAA is premised on ensuring that a wrong has a meaningful 
remedy. As discussed earlier, Congress enacted the FAA in large part 
to ensure that the breach of an agreement to arbitrate would have a 
meaningful remedy and not be enforceable by mere monetary dam-
ages.154 Thus, arbitration provisions were given a remedy that actually 
made sense and that was appropriate to the breach. The point was to 
 
152. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
153. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra Part I. 
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make arbitration provisions as enforceable as other contracts, not to 
impair the ability to enforce other contractual, statutory, or common 
law rights. 
Given this background, it is difficult to fathom the Court’s dis-
regard for the impact that enforcement of an arbitration provision has 
on these other rights. That disregard was on display in Concepcion 
when the Court brushed aside concerns that small dollar claims that 
could have been brought as a class action if litigation were permitted 
might “slip through the legal system” if an arbitration provision pro-
hibiting collective action were enforced.155 The Court stated as follows: 
“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, 
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”156 Somewhere along the 
line, preventing claims from being lost in the system apparently became 
merely “desirable.” 
In some ways, Italian Colors was even more harmful in that it 
reduced a promising doctrine that would have required consideration of 
the impact of enforcement on the parties and reduced it to almost noth-
ing. In Italian Colors, the Court quoted an earlier case for the prop-
osition that the effective vindication doctrine emanates from a need to 
prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies.”157 The Court added the emphasis, as though all that matters 
is that the right to bring a claim be left intact, regardless of how mini-
mal the chance that such claim will actually be brought. According to 
the Court, a “provision . . . forbidding the assertion of certain stat-
utory rights” would run afoul of the effective vindication doctrine.158 
Does that really need to be said? Maybe it does, because the Court goes 
on to say that the doctrine might perhaps—only “perhaps”—“cover fil-
ing and administrative fees . . . that are so high as to make access to 
the forum impracticable.”159 While it is nice to see the Court conceding 
the possibility that costs may make access to dispute resolution 
“impracticable” and that these costs might be a basis to refuse enforce-
ment, it is puzzling why the Court has so little regard for practical real-
ities. Whether a claim cannot be brought because of high filing fees or 
because it cannot be maintained on an individual basis, the result is the 
same: the claim is not capable of effective vindication. 
 
155. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011).  
156. Id. 
157. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 235 (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 
(1985)). 
158. Id. at 236. 
159. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Trusting Courts with Arbitration Provisions 
845 
The Court’s application of the effective vindication doctrine ignored 
the doctrine’s rationale. While the Court drew the language that it 
quoted and emphasized from a footnote of dicta in an earlier opinion, 
the fuller text of that opinion explains that “so long as the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the ar-
bitral forum, the [federal antitrust] statute will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function.”160 This critical language didn’t 
make it into Italian Colors. If it had, it would have been difficult for 
the Court to have justified enforcing an arbitration provision that 
makes a remedy or a deterrent practically unobtainable. 
The language of the FAA also shows that the FAA is premised on 
arbitration actually occurring in lieu of litigation. As noted above, Sec-
tion 3 provides for the stay of a suit brought in court on an issue covered 
by an arbitration provision. Under Section 3, a court stays “the trial of 
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement . . . .”161 The stay of an action that has been 
brought in court is premised on the assumption that the same action 
can be brought and maintained in arbitration. Congress would not ex-
pect a court to enter an injunction in favor of something that will, in 
all reasonable likelihood, never happen. 
We are left with the strangeness of a jurisprudence that requires 
meaningful enforcement of arbitration agreement even if it strips such 
enforcement from other claims. The FAA was premised on breaches of 
arbitration provisions being subject to meaningful remedies like any 
other claim, not instead of any other claim. The Court, with an appar-
ent lack of self-awareness, quoted earlier precedent to explain that the 
antitrust statutes could be enforced through arbitration because “[n]o 
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”162 It is equally true of the 
FAA as it is of the antitrust laws.  
B. FAA as Court-Empowering, Not Court-Limiting, Legislation 
The Court’s current jurisprudence construes the FAA as a statute 
designed to limit—really, to nearly eliminate—judicial discretion. The 
Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd163 stated that the FAA 
“leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but 
instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed 
to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been 
 
160. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added). 
161. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
162. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S at 234 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per 
curiam)). 
163. 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
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signed.” 164  In a later opinion, the Court reiterated that the FAA 
“requires courts to enforce [arbitration agreements] according to their 
terms.” 165  This mandatory enforcement regime is at the core of 
Concepcion, which stated that courts were required to enforce arbit-
ration provisions as written and according to their terms,166 and of 
Italian Colors, which provided that pursuant to the text of the FAA 
“courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to 
their terms.”167 
The FAA’s origin story, as told in Concepcion and Italian Colors, 
is of a statute born out of judicial hostility towards arbitration. The 
first words of legal analysis in Concepcion are as follows: “The FAA 
was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbi-
tration agreements.”168 Similarly, the Court begins its legal analysis in 
Italian Colors with nearly identical language: “Congress enacted the 
FAA in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration.”169 The 
Court remains ever skeptical that other courts cannot be trusted to 
avoid this judicial hostility if given half a chance. Accordingly, given 
this judicial hostility, the Court must, in its view, be on the lookout for 
any backdoor efforts to undermine arbitration. The same sentiment is 
expressed in a more recent opinion in which the Court indicated that 
the FAA displaces any rule that “covertly” prohibits arbitration “by 
disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining 
features of arbitration.”170 The language used by the Court—“covertly” 
and “oh so coincidentally”171—nearly drips of distrust for the courts, 
which is somewhat strange coming from the Supreme Court. 
By the time Congress passed the FAA, however, judicial hostility 
towards arbitration had largely vanished. By 1925, courts were follow-
ing the old rules, but not out of hostility. Instead, they followed those 
rules because they felt bound by a precedent they no longer agreed with 
but which they felt required legislative action to undo. Though the 
origins of the anachronistic doctrines disfavoring meaningful enforce-
ment of arbitration provisions are not clear,172 the judicial attitude 
 
164. Id. at 218. 
165. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
166. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
167. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221). 
168. 563 U.S. at 339. 
169. 570 U.S. at 232. 
170. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017). 
171. Id. 
172. Possible explanations are a concern by courts that such agreements served 
to “oust the jurisdiction” of the courts in favor of arbitrators.  Kulukundis 
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towards arbitration provisions in the years before Congress passed the 
FAA cannot be ascribed to hostility towards arbitration. As early as 
1872, New York’s highest court observed that the rule of revocability 
was itself “an anomaly in the law” that represented a failure “to give 
effect to contracts, when lawful in themselves, according to their terms 
and the intent of the parties.”173 The court viewed the rule, however, as 
“too well established to be now questioned.”174 Similarly, in 1906 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that it was “much to be regretted 
that agreements to arbitrate . . . should be exempted from the general 
law of contracts and treated as revocable by one party without  consent 
of the other.”175 Nonetheless, the court still upheld the rule which it 
deemed “too firmly settled to be changed without legislative author-
ity.”176 Other courts also reluctantly acceded to the well-settled rule, 
putting aside their disapproval and distaste for it.177 Thus, there was 
not judicial hostility towards or disapproval of arbitration as a means 
of dispute resolution. There was, however, a perceived limitation on the 
ability of a court to enforce a provision meaningfully absent a statutory 
authorization to do so. 
That point was also made clear in the legislative history. The 
Senate Report indicated that the weight of precedential authority had 
perpetuated rules restricting the ability of courts to effectively enforce 
arbitration provisions “long after the courts themselves could no longer 
see that they were founded in reason or justice.”178 The House Report, 
too, noted the FAA was necessary because “courts have felt that the 
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative 
 
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983–84 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Another possible reason was that courts 
feared that arbitration tribunals lacked the means to give redress. S. Rep. 
No. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (describing this as a possible reason for the rule). 
Julius Henry Cohen speculated that that resistance to arbitration was based 
on a concern that stronger parties would take advantage of weaker ones. 
Joint Hearings, supra note 24, at 15 (1924). 
173. President of Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50 N.Y. 250, 258–59 
(1872). 
174. Id. at 258. 
175. Henry v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 64 A. 635, 636 (Pa. 1906). 
176. Id. 
177. See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 
1006, 1007–12 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing the rule of revocability but 
upholding it in light of the rule’s firmly settled nature); Berkovitz v. Arbib 
& Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921) (noting that the archaic 
rules had been criticized by many courts who nonetheless felt bound by 
“deference to early precedents”). 
178. S. Rep. No. 68-526, at 3 (1924). 
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enactment, although they have frequently criticized the rule and 
recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results from it.”179 
And, in an article by the American Bar Association Committee on 
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law—the committee that drafted 
the FAA—the authors note that by the time the FAA was adopted, 
judicial hostility was “more apparent than real and was due to an 
adherence to precedent.”180 
The FAA was not needed to correct any judicial hostility towards 
arbitration that existed in 1925, but rather to give courts power they 
lacked. American courts seemed very willing to enforce arbitration pro-
visions in a meaningful way, but felt restricted by a precedent that re-
sulted from an old English hostility. The FAA freed the courts from 
those precedents. The FAA was designed not to restrict the courts but 
to empower them. 
The modern arbitration statutes were understood as expanding, not 
limiting, judicial power. In 1924, the Supreme Court in Red Cross Line 
v. Atlantic Fruit Co.181 addressed the New York Arbitration Law on 
which the FAA was based.182 The Court noted that the New York 
Arbitration Law “authorizes” a court to direct that arbitration proceed 
or to stay a court action that has been brought on issues subject to ar-
bitration.183 The Court used the word “authorizes.” It did not speak in 
terms of what the act “requires” or “compels.” 
Julius Henry Cohen also indicated that the modern arbitration laws 
were designed to enhance judicial authority. In his article on the New 
York Arbitration Law, Cohen observed that in addition to annulling 
the rule of revocability, the law also “establishes legal machinery for 
protecting, safeguarding and supervising commercial arbitration. 
Instead of narrowing the jurisdiction of [a New York state trial court] 
it broadens it. It adds to its equity powers.”184 
The FAA’s legislative history and case law are in accord with this 
view. For instance, the Senate Report notes that with the passage of 
the FAA courts would no longer be “without power to grant equitable 
 
179. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924). 
180. Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, The United States 
Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155 (1925). 
181. 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
182. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008) (noting that 
the “text of the FAA was based upon that of New York’s arbitration 
statute”); see also S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The bill . . . follows 
the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920.”). 
183. Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 118. 
184. Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York 
Statute, 31 Yale L.J. 147, 150 (1921). 
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relief.”185 The language of a 1932 Supreme Court case, Marine Transit 
Corp. v. Dreyfus186 is also telling. In that case the Court stated that 
“Section 4 authorizes a court . . . to ‘make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.’”187 Again, the Court does not say the Act “requires” or 
“mandates” a court to make such an order, but rather that it authorizes 
a court to do so. The Court understood the FAA as empowering courts 
to do something they previously could not. 
Despite the strong indications that the FAA was designed to 
empower courts, the Court has still read the FAA as largely having 
been designed to strip courts of their discretion. This is in large part 
due to the Court’s significant misreading—in one instance a literal one, 
and in the others interpretative errors—of the FAA. I discuss those in 
the next part of the Article. 
C. The Court’s Misreading and Misinterpretation of the FAA’s Text 
The Court has misinterpreted the FAA. One group of errors in-
volves the Court’s reading of the word “shall” in the FAA as though it 
means “must.” The other errors involve references to enforcement ac-
cording to the terms of the arbitration agreement. This Section of the 
Article discusses these crucial errors. 
As noted earlier, the Court has read the FAA as largely eliminating 
judicial discretion.188 The Concepcion Court spoke in terms of what the 
FAA requires of the courts as follows:  
Section 2 makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable” as written (subject, of course, to the saving clause); 
§3 requires courts to stay litigation of arbitral claims pending 
arbitration of those claims “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement”; and §4 requires courts to compel arbitration “in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.”189 
The Concepcion Court’s supposed focus on the text of the FAA is 
undermined by a surprising lack of fealty towards what that text ac-
tually says and a blatant misreading of the statute. The Court began 
with Section 2: “Section 2 makes arbitration agreements ‘valid, irrev-
ocable, and enforceable’ as written.”190 Section 2 does not say this. It 
 
185. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
186. 284 U.S. 263 (1932). 
187. Id. at 273–74 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)). 
188. See supra Part III.B. 
189. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2016). 
190. Id. 
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actually says that written arbitration provisions are valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable,191 not that arbitration provisions are valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable as written. That is a pretty big difference. 
The Court has also misinterpreted the text of Sections 3 and 4, 
though this misreading is more understandable. The Court says that 
Section 3 “requires courts to stay litigation” and that section 4 “requires 
courts to compel arbitration.”192 Neither Section 3 nor 4 actually uses 
the word “requires.” Nor do they use the word “must.” The word 
Congress used in both of these sections is “shall.” Section 3 states that 
when the conditions of the statute are satisfied the court 
“shall . . . stay the trial of the action.”193 Section 4 states, among other 
things, that when the conditions of the statute are satisfied the court 
“shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.”194 
It is certainly true that “shall” can mean “must.” In this instance, how-
ever, it does not, a point discussed below. 
The Concepcion Court did correctly quote the language “in accord-
ance with the terms of the agreement,” but read it as a mandate to 
enshrine the precise terms of the arbitration agreement.195 The Court in 
Italian Colors similarly read this language as calling on courts to 
“‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according to their terms.”196 
That, too, is a misconstruction of the text. 
1. “Shall” and “Must” in the FAA 
The word “shall” appears many times in the FAA, but, as noted 
above, the Court has given special attention to its appearance in Sec-
tions 3 and 4, the key procedural sections of the FAA. Section 3 pro-
vides that a court shall order a stay of litigation as follows: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the 
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such 
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in 
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial 
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance 
 
191. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
192. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. 
193. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
194. Id. § 4. 
195. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344. 
196. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (quoting 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
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with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the 
stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.197 
Similarly, Section 4 provides that “upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply there-
with is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties 
to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment.”198 It also provides that if the making of the agreement is at issue 
and the matter is referred to a jury, then “if the jury find that no agree-
ment in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in 
proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily di-
recting the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with 
the terms thereof.”199 
The Court has, in recent years, read this “shall” as mandating court 
action. As already noted in Byrd, the Court emphasized the word 
“shall” and stated that “[b]y its terms, the [Federal Arbitration] Act 
leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but in-
stead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed 
to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been 
signed.”200 The Court in Concepcion also read these “shalls” as telling 
a court what is was “require[d]” to do.201 
“Shall” carries many possible meanings. Black’s Law Dictionary 
includes five different meanings, among them are these: “[h]as a duty 
to . . . ,” “[s]hould,” “[m]ay,” “[w]ill” and “[i]s entitled to.”202 Bryan 
Garner notes in his text on legal writing that although “shall” often 
signifies must, “the word frequently bears other meanings—sometimes 
even masquerading as a synonym of ‘may’ . . . In just about every ju-
risdiction, courts have held that ‘shall’ can mean not just must’ and 
‘may,’ but also ‘will’ and ‘is.’”203 Judge Easterbrook described the word 
shall as “notoriously slippery”204  and observed, regarding a statute 
providing that certain information “shall be disclosed” by the state of 
Illinois, that it was possible that shall was “permissive rather than 
 
197. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 
198. Id. § 4. 
199. Id. 
200. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218. 
201. See supra Part II.B.1. 
202. Shall, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
203. Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing in Plain English: A Text with 
Exercises 105 (2001). 
204. McCready v. White, 417 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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compulsory” in that context. 205 While Judge Easterbrook described 
“shall” as notoriously slippery, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
Garner characterize it as a “semantic mess” in their book Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts.206 Legal drafters, they observe, “have 
been notoriously sloppy with their shalls.”207 
While in recent opinions the Court has read “shall” in the FAA as 
meaning “must,” two opinions by the Court much closer in time to the 
passage of the FAA read the word differently. In 1932, the Court, in 
Dreyfus, assessed a claim that the FAA was not constitutional. The 
claim was that the application of the FAA was not compatible “with 
the maintenance of the judicial power of the United States as extended 
to cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”208 The Court held that 
the FAA was constitutional. Congress had the power to “authorize” a 
court to grant specific performance when appropriate,209 even in admi-
ralty jurisdiction where such a remedy is not usually given.210 Nowhere 
was this described as a restriction on the maritime court, but rather, it 
was seen as a grant of authority on those courts. 
The Court decided another case less than one decade after the FAA 
became effective. In Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester 
Service Corp.,211 the Court analyzed the import of Section 3 and in 
doing do, the Court read “shall” to mean “may.”212 The Court addressed 
a claim that a federal district court lacked power to grant a stay under 
the terms of the arbitration agreement.213 The Court observed that the 
agreement by its terms applied only to the grant of specific perfor-
mance, not the entry of a stay under Section 3. The Court described 
Section 3 as follows: “Section 3 . . . provides broadly that the court 
may ‘stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.’”214 And the Court also 
described Section 3 as providing the “power to grant a stay” and Section 
4 as providing the “power to compel arbitration.”215 So, at least for the 
 
205. Id. 
206. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 113 (2012).  
207. Id. at 112. 
208. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277 (1932). 
209. Id. at 278. 
210. Id. 
211. 293 U.S. 449 (1935). 
212. Id. at 452–53. 
213. Id. at 452. 
214. Id. at 452–53. 
215. Id. at 453. 
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first decade of the statute’s existence, “shall” meant “may” and was 
intended to bestow power on the courts. 
The language of the statute also supports the proposition that 
“shall” in Sections 3 and 4 does not mean “must.” Within the FAA, 
when Congress wanted to indicate clearly that court action was re-
quired, it knew the word to use was “must,” which is the word it used 
in Section 9.216 That section addresses, among other things, situations 
in which the agreement of the parties provides that a judgment of the 
court is to be entered on entry of an arbitration award and specifies the 
court to enter such a confirming order. Upon application to the specified 
court for an order, Section 9 provides that “the court must grant such 
an order” unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected in accord-
ance with the FAA.217 
The Court has interpreted this “must grant” language of Section 9. 
In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,218 the Court observed: 
“There is nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally 
tells courts to grant confirmation in all cases” except where one of the 
statutory exceptions applies.219 The key relevant sections of the FAA—
the ones that provide for the grant of a stay of litigation or a motion 
to compel arbitration—do not use this non-malleable language but in-
stead use “shall.” 
Julius Henry Cohen also flagged the importance of the use of the 
word “must” in Section 9. In a 1926 article co-authored by Cohen, he 
described the then newly-passed law, and characterized the grant of a 
motion to compel arbitration as part of a sequence: “The court then 
enters an order directing that the arbitration shall proceed.”220 Three 
paragraphs later, the authors describe the Section 9 requirement in 
much more forceful and direct terms: “Under the statute, if the 
[arbitration] award is not voluntarily performed, it must be entered as 
a judgment of the court.”221 
Courts have always exercised discretion in deciding whether to 
grant specific performance. As the Supreme Court noted 130 years ago, 
the “question in cases of specific performance . . . is not what the 
court must do, but what, under the circumstances, it may do, in the 
 
216. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
217. Id. (emphasis added). 
218. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
219. Id. at 587. 
220. Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 
Va. L. Rev. 265, 272 (1926) (emphasis added). 
221. Id. 
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exercise of its discretion to grant or withhold relief of that character.”222 
As a leading treatise in contract law notes, “[a]n action for specific per-
formance is equitable in nature, and therefore, equitable principles are 
to be followed in determining its availability and its implementation.”223 
Given that the “normal” rule of contract law is that such discretion 
exists and that the FAA is designed to make arbitration provisions into 
“normal” contracts, a very clear signal—a “must” or an “is required”—
would be expected if Congress intended to so drastically change the role 
of courts in granting equitable relief. Some cases roughly contempora-
neous with the passage of the FAA demonstrate the point. In Becker 
v. Lebanon & Myerstown Railway Co.,224 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court noted that when statutory language directs what a court “shall” 
do in areas where courts traditionally exercise discretion, the typical 
understanding of “shall” as mandatory may be inappropriate.225 The 
court addressed a refusal by a court of equity to grant injunctive relief. 
The court refrained from granting this remedy because the dispropor-
tionate injury to the respondent outweighed the benefit to the com-
plainant property owner.226 The property owner claimed that the court 
had erred in not granting the injunction. The owner argued that the 
statute at issue made an injunction mandatory because it provided that 
after ascertaining that a corporation acted without the right to do an 
act from which alleged injury occurs, courts “if exercising equitable 
power, shall by injunction . . . restrain such injurious acts.”227 
The court did not read the language of the statute as mandatory, 
as the property owner urged. Instead, the court stated that the “word 
‘shall,’ when used by the legislature to a court, is usually a grant of 
 
222. Hennessey v. Woolworth, 128 U.S. 438, 442 (1888) (citations omitted). See 
also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236 (1892) (“[F]rom time 
immemorial it has been the recognized duty of [courts of equity] to exercise 
a discretion; to refuse their aid in the enforcement of unconscionable, 
oppressive or iniquitous contracts; and to turn the party claiming the benefit 
of such contract over to a court of law.”). 
223. 25 Williston on Contracts § 67:1 (4th ed. 2002); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 357 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (providing that the 
grant of specific performance is to be made in light of referenced discretionary 
considerations); Restatement (First) of Contracts § 359 (Am Law 
Inst. 1932) (stating that if money damages are inadequate as a matter of 
law then the determination as to whether specific performance should be 
granted is left in the discretion of the court). 
224. 41 A. 612 (Pa. 1898). 
225. Id. at 613. 
226. Id. at 612. 
227. Id. at 613 (quoting Act of June 19, 1871, Pub. L. No. 1361). 
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authority, and means ‘may.’”228 This reading of the word “shall” was 
particularly appropriate because the statute related to equitable relief, 
a type of relief traditionally grounded in general discretionary princi-
ples. The court observed that “[n]otwithstanding, therefore, the use of 
the imperative, ‘shall,’ the injunction is not to be granted, unless a 
proper case for injunction be made out, in accordance with the prin-
ciples and practice of equity.”229 
The same reasoning applies to the FAA. Like the statute in Becker, 
the FAA includes the word “shall” in a statute that seems to require 
courts to grant injunctive relief once a certain set of circumstances has 
been established. But in light of Becker and its reasoning, we would 
expect a much stronger legislative signal than a mere “shall” to demon-
strate Congressional intent to remove completely a court’s ability to 
weigh equitable considerations before granting equitable relief. Lacking 
such indication of intent, the FAA should be read as largely main-
taining the usual role of the courts in granting equitable relief. 
Nor is Becker alone in standing for the proposition that when the 
word “shall” appears in a statute directed towards the courts there is 
reason to doubt that it means “must.” The New York State Court of 
Appeals in State v. Munro,230 a case decided just two years before New 
York passed the arbitration law on which the FAA’s language was 
based,231 observed that the “word ‘shall,’ when used by the Legislature 
to a court, is usually a grant of authority and means ‘may.’”232 As in 
Becker, a statute impacting on judicial authority was deemed to be per-
missive, not mandatory. The statute at issue authorized the Court of 
Claims to hear the claim of an individual who had been injured while 
in the employ of the state and provided that “[i]f the court finds that 
such injuries were so sustained, damages therefor shall constitute a legal 
and valid claim against the state, and the court shall award to and 
render judgment for the claimant for such sum as shall be just and 
equitable.”233 The court rejected the implication that the word “shall” 
in this context was intended to “make it compulsory to award 
 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. 119 N.E. 444 (N.Y. 1918). 
231. See Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008) 
(noting that the “text of the FAA was based upon that of New York’s 
arbitration statute”); see also S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (“The 
bill . . . follows the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 
1920.”). 
232. Munro, 119 N.E. at 445 (quoting In re Supervisor of Nether Providence 
Twp., 64 Pa. 443, 444 (1906)). 
233. Id. at 445. 
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damages.”234 As the court noted, the word “shall” in a statute is not 
always compulsory and that the “clear intent of the Legislature was to 
confer authority and power upon the Court of Claims, and not to direct 
or control its action.”235 
Legislatures do not lightly limit courts in areas that have tradi-
tionally been left to judicial discretion. In the 1902 decision Clancy v. 
McElroy,236 the Washington Supreme Court read the word “shall” in a 
statute directed at a court as not mandatory in nature. The court 
addressed a statute that dealt with the duty of an executor to file an 
inventory of an estate in a timely manner. That statute provided that 
if an executor failed to make a timely filing, “the court shall revoke the 
letters testamentary or of administration.”237 The court in Clancy re-
jected the argument that this section was mandatory and that the 
legislature intended to eliminate judicial discretion as to the removal of 
an executor who failed to file the inventory in a timely manner. The 
court observed that determining the meaning of “shall” in a statute re-
quires considering both the letter and spirit of the statute. The court 
noted that the words “‘may’ and ‘shall’ may be used according to the 
context and intent found in the statute, and are frequently construed 
interchangeably.”238 Reading this statute in light of the general “nature 
of probate procedure and the ordinary discretion of the superior court 
in such proceedings,”239 the court held that the word “shall” was not 
mandatory, and that the superior court retained its usual discretion 
despite the use of the word “shall.”240 Other cases roughly contempora-
neous with the passage of the FAA also show that “shall” need not be 
considered to be mandatory.241 
 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. 70 P. 1095 (Wash. 1902). 
237. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added). 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. See, e.g., Barkley v. Pool, 169 N.W. 730, 732 (Neb. 1918) (noting that “[t]he 
word ‘shall’ in statutes, as in colloquial speech, is frequently interpreted to 
mean a direction, rather than a mandate” and that it should be interpreted 
as such, and holding that language in the state’s constitution about when an 
election “shall” be held is directory because the legislature may pick a 
different date in some situations); Fagan v. Robbins, 117 So. 863, 865–66 
(Fla. 1928) (determining the word “shall” in a statute calling for a court to 
enter a deficiency decree was discretionary, not mandatory, and was merely 
intended to provide authorization and not to require judicial action). The 
California Supreme Court went so far, in a 1913 opinion, to set forth as a 
general rule of construction of the time that “the word ‘shall’ when found in 
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Examining how the word “shall” is used in other places in the FAA 
also shows Congress intended to establish the steps in a procedure. The 
word comes up many times in the FAA and even in Section 4. The 
section starts by indicating how the process for obtaining an order to 
compel arbitration begins—with a party petitioning a court for such an 
order. Then Section 4 describes what a court does after such a petition 
is made: “The court shall hear the parties.”242 Section 4 provides that 
later in the process “[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement or the 
failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court 
shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be 
demanded . . . the court shall hear and determine such issue.”243 
Substituting the mandatory “must” for “shall” strikes the wrong 
chord. It seems unlikely that Congress would command that a court 
must hear the parties. Nor would Congress likely command that a court 
must hear and determine an issue. That is what courts do. The phrase 
“the court shall hear the parties” is probably better rendered as the 
“court then hears the parties,” establishing a step in the procedure, 
rather than a requirement that “the court must hear the parties.” The 
phrase “the court shall hear and determine such issue” is better rend-
ered “next, the court hears and determines the issue” rather than 
requiring that “the court must hear and must determine the issue.” 
Congress is simply setting forth a sequence and a procedure. 
Later in Section 4 we find another instance that a court “shall” do 
something, and in this case a reading of the language as mandatory is 
internally illogical. Section 4 provides that if an issue as to contract 
formation is raised and a demand for jury trial is made, “the court shall 
make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner pro-
vided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a 
jury for that purpose.”244 The “shall” in this instance cannot mean 
“must.” If it did, the sentence would effectively be stating that the 
court must do one thing—make an order referring the matter to a jury 
in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—but 
it may do something different, that is call a jury specially for the pur-
pose. “Shall” is not “must,” and reading it as “must” would be incon-
sistent with the discretionary aspect of the rest of the sentence. Reading 
“shall” instead as articulating a step in a new procedure makes for a 
perfectly sensible interpretation—a party demands a jury trial and then 
 
a statute is not to be construed to be mandatory, unless the intent of the 
Legislature that it shall be so construed is unequivocally evidenced.” Cake 
v. City of Los Angeles, 130 P. 723, 725 (Cal. 1913). 
242. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (emphasis added). 
243. Id. (emphasis added). 
244. Id. (emphases added). 
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the court refers the matter to a jury in accordance with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or specially calls a jury. 
This Article does not argue that the word “shall” in the FAA simply 
means a fully discretionary “may,” although “shall” can have that 
meaning. Just as this Article argued that Congress knew how to use 
the word “must” to indicate a true mandate to a court in Section 9, it 
must also concede that Congress also knew how to use the word “may” 
to indicate complete judicial discretion. In Section 10, the FAA states 
that a court “may make an order vacating” an arbitration award,245 
while Section 11 states that a court “may make an order modifying or 
correcting the [arbitration] award.”246 So when the FAA uses the word 
“shall” it means neither “must” nor “may.” 
The “shalls” of Section 3 and 4 are best understood as establishing 
a procedure and a sequence and are best read as meaning “then” or “is 
to.” What is set forth is the usual and ordinary procedure. Such an un-
derstanding is fully consistent with the legislative history. The FAA, 
the House Report notes, “declares simply” that arbitration agreements 
“shall be enforced,” which it does in Section 2, and “provides a proce-
dure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.”247 That is all Sections 
3 and 4 do; they establish a sequence and a procedure that will, in the 
ordinary course of events, be followed. 
2. Enforcement “According to Its Terms” 
The supposed mandate to enforce arbitration provisions exactly on 
the terms set forth in the agreement is not present in the FAA. So eager 
was the Court in Concepcion to establish such a mandate that it dis-
regarded the actual language of Section 2. As noted above, the Court 
incorrectly stated that Section 2 provides that arbitration provisions 
are “‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ as written.”248 It is under-
standable why the Court would want the central provision of the FAA 
to include a requirement that arbitration provisions are enforceable as 
written. If the language were there, it would strengthen the argument 
that the precise terms of an arbitration agreement are due some special 
form of protection. But Section 2 does not say this. Instead, it states 
that written arbitration provisions are enforceable, not that arbitration 
provisions are enforceable as written.249 The absence of this language 
from the central provision can only weaken the Court’s position. 
 
245. Id. § 10. 
246. Id. § 11. 
247. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924). 
248. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (quoting 9 
U.S.C. § 2). 
249. See supra Part III.C. 
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While the language supposedly requiring enforcement of an arbitra-
tion provision according to its terms is not in Section 2, it does appear 
in the procedural sections. For instance, Section 4 provides for the court 
to “make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in ac-
cordance with the terms of the agreement.”250 Section 3 provides for a 
stay of litigation until “arbitration has been had in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement[s].”251 
But this does not make the language of the arbitration agreement 
sacrosanct. The purpose of the FAA is to make arbitration provisions 
as enforceable as other contract provisions. Arbitration provisions are 
to be treated like “normal” contracts. But courts are not required to 
enforce “normal” contracts exactly as written. Consider unconscion-
ability, one of the generally applicable contract defenses the Court has 
also applied to arbitration provisions. Under the common law, a court 
has the authority to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract, but 
it may also “enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
term to avoid any unconscionable result.”252 Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, covering sales of goods, provides essentially the same 
rule.253 
And the precise words of an agreement are certainly not inviolable 
when it comes to equitable relief. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts provides that an order compelling performance or granting an 
injunction “will be so drawn as best to effectuate the purposes for which 
the contract was made and on such terms as justice requires. It need 
not be absolute in form and the performance that it requires need not 
be identical with that due under the contract.”254 Congress did not 
intend to make arbitration provisions into super-contracts, just into 
normal ones. Normal contracts need not be enforced to their exact 
letter, particularly when it comes to enforcement through specific per-
formance. 
We are still left with the references to enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms. We can use Section 4 as an 
 
250. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
251. Id. § 3. 
252. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
253. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (Am. Law Inst. & Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2017) (providing that if a court finds a 
contract or contract clause unconscionable it may refuse to enforce the 
contract “or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”). 
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 358(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) 
(emphasis added). 
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example. It provides that a court “shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.”255 The Court has read this language as though it provides 
that a court “must make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration using the exact procedures set forth in the arbitration 
agreement.” First, we know this is not what Congress intended because 
the exact terms of a typical contract are not sacrosanct in this way. 
Second, the Court is reading too much into language that is nothing 
more than a description of specific performance. 
Prior to the passage of the FAA, courts were not authorized to 
grant specific performance for the breach of an agreement to arbitrate, 
but were only authorized to grant money damages. The FAA provides 
a procedure for the specific performance of arbitration provisions in 
Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 provides for what we might consider 
negative specific relief by preventing a party from maintaining a lawsuit 
in court when an issue being litigated is subject to arbitration by calling 
for a court ordered stay.256 Section 4 provides for an order to compel 
the parties to arbitrate.257 Both sections include the language “accord-
ing to the terms,” or variations of it.258 
The language simply describes specific performance. Unlike when a 
court awards money damages, when a court orders specific performance 
it is ordering performance in accordance with the terms of the agree-
ment. Consider the language of one treatise on contract law—edited by 
no less than Arthur Corbin—from 1924 that notes various types of relief 
available for a breach of contract.259 First, the treatise states that a 
plaintiff can ask for “[d]amages, or compensation for the non-
performance of a contract.”260 These are the type of damages that 
Congress deemed inadequate for breach of an agreement to arbitrate, 
which is why Congress provides for specific performance under the 
FAA. The treatise describes specific performance as follows: “[s]pecific 
performance, or an order that a contract should be carried into effect 
by the defendant according to its terms.”261 This same language is used 
 
255. 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
256. See id. § 3. 
257. Id. § 4. 
258. Section 3 calls for a stay until arbitration “has been had in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement.” Id. § 3. Section 4 calls for an order “directing 
the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.” Id. § 4. 
259. William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 15 (Arthur 
L. Corbin ed., 16th ed. 1924). 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
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in a leading treatise on Equity from 1918 to describe what a court does 
when it grants specific performance of a contract. That treatise states 
that the “Court of Equity enforces a contract according to its terms” 
when merely granting money damages “would violate the real object of 
the contract in the minds of the parties when the contract was made.”262 
The Court has taken a simple description of what specific perfor-
mance is—a court ordering performance of a contract’s terms as op-
posed to granting money damages—and read it as though it were a 
directive to enforce a term exactly as written. No other type of contract 
is treated this way in the law. 
D. The Court’s Unduly Narrow Reading of the Saving Clause 
The Court has focused quite a bit on what has been called the “sav-
ing clause” of Section 2. As noted, Section 2 makes arbitration 
provisions in interstate commerce “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”263 The Court first described the emphasized language 
as a saving clause in Prima-Paint, a 1967 decision in which the Court 
observed that the “saving clause” indicates Congress’ intent in 1925 “to 
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not 
more so” and to ensure that arbitration provisions not be elevated 
above other types of contracts.264 Despite the understanding of the 
Court in Prima-Paint that this language was not intended to shield 
arbitration provisions from judicial review, since then, the Court has 
read it very narrowly, emphasizing on several occasions that only 
grounds applicable to “any contract” can be applied to arbitration 
provisions, presumably reading “any contract” to mean “every single 
type of contract.”265 
A more sensible understanding of the saving clause, comes from a 
somewhat unexpected source—the 1982 amendment to a statute related 
to patent law. Prior to that amendment, there was a question as to 
whether pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate a dispute involving patent 
 
262. 2 Joseph Story, LL.D., Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 
§ 1027, 408 (W.H. Lyon Jr. ed., 14th ed. 1918). 
263. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
264. Prima-Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967). 
265. See discussion supra Part II.A. Stephen Ware has suggested that this 
language must be taken literally: “A permissible ground for 
revocation . . . must be a ground for the revocation of ‘any contract,’” and 
not “‘any contract in the relevant class of contracts.’” Stephen J. Ware, 
Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional 
Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 39, 47 (2003). According to Ware, if 
the results of taking the language both seriously and literally are undesirable, 
then legislation to fix the problem is the appropriate approach. Id. 
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law were covered by the FAA. Some cases casted doubt as to whether 
they were.266 The legislative history of the 1982 amendment shows that 
Congress amended the statute to resolve that doubt, to clearly author-
ize agreements to arbitrate disputes as to the validity and infringement 
of patents, and to assure parties that they could avail themselves of the 
benefits of arbitration.267 The amended language of the statute makes 
clear that a contract can include a provision for the arbitration of pat-
ent validity and infringement issues.268 The statute further provides 
that such a provision “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, ex-
cept for any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a 
contract.”269 Sound familiar? 
This language is very similar to that found in Section 2 of the FAA. 
Congress was not attempting to come up with a new standard for 
arbitration provisions relating to patent disputes. In making this 
amendment, Congress was overriding cases that questioned the appli-
cability of the FAA to patent statutes and indeed, the patent statute 
specifically makes arbitration of patent disputes subject to the FAA.270 
The choice of language by Congress in 1982 is simply an effort to restate 
and modernize the phrasing from the Section 2 saving clause. Congress 
did not use the “any contract” language in articulating a standard that 
was surely intended to mirror the coverage of the FAA. Instead, it made 
arbitration provisions subject to “any grounds that exist in law or in 
equity for revocation of a contract.” That is an important change be-
cause “any” modifies not “contract” but rather “grounds.” This has a 
much more expansive feel to it and can probably be understood as this: 
An arbitration provision can only be revoked on grounds that sound in 
contract law. This is a much more sensible approach than the “any con-
tract” perspective. And if we are searching for Congressional intent, 
then the language Congress uses in a statute meant to replicate the ef-
fect of Section 2 is highly probative. 
The Court’s analysis of the saving clause took another unfortunate 
turn in the Casarotto case.	As discussed earlier, in Casarotto, the Court 
held that a Montana law that made arbitration provisions unenforce-
 
266. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Tech. Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 
(7th Cir. 1970) (affirming trial court’s holding that issues relating to patent 
validity are not appropriate for arbitration and that they should be decided 
by a court); Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 185–86 (D. Del. 
1930) (holding that agreements to arbitrate patent disputes are not subject 
to the FAA). 
267. H.R. Rep. No. 97-542, at 12–13 (1982). 
268. See 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2012) (authorizing arbitration provisions relating 
to patent disputes arising out of a contract). 
269. Id.  
270. See id. § 294(b). 
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able unless the parties met certain notice requirements conflicted with 
the FAA.271 Such a law, according to the Court, was not applicable to 
“any contract” but just to arbitration provisions and so was incon-
sistent with the FAA.272 But the Court could easily have reached the 
opposite result. 
Congress was not motivated to pass the FAA because of rules, like 
that in the Montana statute, that try to ensure that the parties have 
knowledge of arbitration provisions in contracts. It was motivated 
instead by rules like the rule of revocability, which exiled arbitration 
provisions from the world of contract law, and rules that disabled courts 
from enforcing arbitration provisions by specific performance. These 
rules were premised on a belief that arbitrators were not capable of 
reaching equitable determinations. But rules requiring varying levels of 
disclosure for different types of contract provisions are not foreign to 
contract law. For example, written disclaimers of the implied warranty 
of merchantability in sales of goods must be conspicuous and mention 
the word “merchantability” to be effective.273 This is not an expression 
of hostility towards warranty disclaimers, but rather a recognition that 
such a term is significant and that it is important that a buyer under-
stand and be aware of any waiver of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability. The Montana statute was in this same vein: a determination by 
the Montana legislature that arbitration is important and that the 
parties should have notice of such a provision in a contract. 
But the error of Casarotto is really overshadowed by the 
Concepcion Court’s misapplication of the preemption doctrine to 
provide new layers of protection for arbitration provisions. 
E. The Court’s Flawed Preemption Analysis 
The Concepcion Court’s application of the preemption doctrine to 
its FAA analysis poses significant danger to the ability of courts to 
make meaningful assessments of arbitration provisions. Even neutral 
doctrines must only be applied so as not to disfavor arbitration. The 
Court in Concepcion identified the “overarching purpose of the FAA” 
as being “to ensure the enforcement of arbitration provisions according 
to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”274 The Court 
held that the Discover Bank rule interfered with that purpose by requir-
ing a less streamlined procedure than the one set forth in the arbitration 
 
271. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996). 
272. Id. 
273. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (Am. Law Inst. & Nat’l Conference of 
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2017) (providing that written disclaimers 
of the implied warranty of merchantability must mention merchantability 
and be conspicuous). 
274. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). 
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provision, and was therefore preempted.275 Concepcion seems to make 
any application of the law that would make an arbitration proceeding 
less streamlined than provided for in the arbitration agreement incon-
sistent with the FAA. 
The Court stated that it had identified the purpose of the FAA 
from the statute’s text, from which the Court deemed the purpose was 
“readily apparent.”276 But it read the statute incorrectly. It did so on a 
literal level by stating that Section 2 makes arbitration agreements 
“‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable’ as written.”277 Section 2 does not 
say arbitration provisions are valid as written, but rather that written 
arbitration provisions are valid.278 The Court made a number of other 
questionable interpretations, such as reading Sections 3 and 4 as 
“requir[ing]” action by a court when those sections merely establish a 
process, and by calling for enforcement of terms exactly as written even 
though such a reading would turn arbitration provisions into super-con-
tracts rather than normal ones.  
Further, the Court’s focus on streamlined proceedings is badly 
undermined by the fact that two prior cases calling for “rigorous enforc-
ement” of arbitration provisions resulted in less streamlined proceed-
ings. In Byrd, rigorous enforcement actually resulted in an inefficient 
process, with some claims being arbitrated and some litigated, not in 
streamlined proceedings and certainly not in the denial of a plaintiff’s 
realistic hope of pursuing any right or remedy.279 Similarly, another case 
premised on the need for courts to rigorously enforce arbitration pro-
visions resulted in a stay of arbitration pursuant to California law and 
hence a less efficient process. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,280 the Court 
held that the parties’ agreement that arbitration be held in accordance 
with California law meant that such law would apply instead of federal 
law.281 California law gave the courts the power to stay arbitration 
pending resolution of related litigation. Rigorous enforcement thus 
required that this non-streamlined approach to arbitration be fol-
lowed.282 Neither of these cases stand for the proposition that “rigorous 
 
275. Id. at 346. 
276. Id. at 344. 
277. Id. 
278. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (providing that written arbitration agreements are 
valid, irrevocable and enforceable). 
279. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220–22 (1985). 
280. 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
281. Id. at 470. 
282. See id. at 478–79. 
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enforcement” means ignoring the impact enforcement would have on 
the ability of a party to bring and maintain a claim. 
The legislative history does not hide the purpose of the FAA. The 
House Report states as follows in its first sentence: “The purpose of this 
bill is to make valid and enforc[ea]ble agreements for arbitration con-
tained in contracts involving interstate commerce.” 283  The Senate 
Report simply notes that the purpose of the FAA is “clearly set forth 
in section 2,” which the report simply quotes in its entirety.284 Thus, it 
is Section 2, not Section 3 or Section 4, we should look to in determining 
the legislative intent of the FAA. The FAA simply moves arbitration 
provisions to the category of “normal” contracts. An arbitration agree-
ment is “placed upon the same footing as other contracts, where it 
belongs.”285 
Because the Court got the purpose of the FAA wrong, its “purposes 
and objectives” pre-emption analysis is premised on a mistake. Courts 
ought not be trying to make arbitration provisions into super-contracts, 
or ensuring that streamlined proceedings are made sacrosanct regardless 
of how onerous they are in their impact. We should, instead, be trying 
to effectuate the goal of the FAA to treat arbitration provisions like 
any other contractual terms. 
IV. Trust the Courts 
The key goal of the previous Part of this Article was to clear away 
the misunderstandings and errors that undergird the current juris-
prudence on the FAA in order to create space for a simple proposition: 
Before enforcing an arbitration provision by specific performance, a 
court should engage in the same analysis it does before granting specific 
relief for any type of contract. Permitting this analysis would put arbi-
tration provisions in the same category as other contracts. Insulating 
arbitration agreements from this analysis would actually run afoul of 
the FAA, as it would place arbitration provisions once again in their 
own special non-contract world when it comes to enforcement. 
Prior to granting equitable relief for breach of contract, a court en-
gages in a two-step process. First, a court considers whether money 
damages would serve as an adequate remedy for the breach of contract 
and, if they would, a court will not grant specific performance.286 On 
 
283. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
284. S. Rep. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
285. H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1. 
286. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1) (Am. Law Inst. 
1981) (“Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages 
would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.”); 
John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts 839 (4th ed. 2001) 
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this point, it is fair to say that Congress has made a meta-finding that 
money damages are not an adequate remedy for breach of an arbitration 
agreement. The insufficiency of money damages for such breaches was 
a large reason for the passage of the FAA. A party seeking to enforce 
an arbitration provision should not be required to make such a showing. 
The second step requires a court to weigh a number of equitable 
considerations. As one treatise notes, “[i]t is important to emphasize 
the discretionary nature of equitable relief” and a court may deny relief 
if it “would be unfair to grant it.”287 The discretionary considerations 
are well established. The most recent edition of a leading treatise on 
Contract law begins its discussion of the factors considered in granting 
specific relief by providing the “apt[ ] summary[ ]” from an 1884 opinion 
as follows: 
The equitable remedy of specific performance of 
agreements . . . rests largely in judicial discretion, directed and 
regulated by defined rules. Well settled elements and incidents 
are requisite to granting relief, but whether relief shall be granted 
depends upon an equitable consideration of the particular 
circumstances of each case. The contract must be just, fair, and 
reasonable, must not have originated in mistake, surprise, 
violation of confidence, breach of trust, advantage of condition, 
nor been obtained by any unconscientious or unfair methods. The 
contract must also be reasonably certain in respect to the subject 
matter, terms, and stipulations; it must be founded on a valuable 
consideration and its performance not work hardship or 
injustice.288  
These considerations are, of course, grounds that exist at equity and 
that apply to all contracts when specific performance is sought, and 
therefore satisfy the saving clause. 
One concern might be that the breadth of these considerations 
could create a way for courts to do exactly what the Supreme Court 
feared and to tilt the playing field against arbitration provisions. But 
judicial discretion is not unfettered in this area. As the Nebraska 
Supreme Court recently observed, a “court’s discretion to order specific 
performance is controlled by established principles of equity and de-
pending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is 
 
(observing that “[s]cores of cases” indicate that specific performance is not 
to be granted when money damages are adequate). 
287. Murray, supra note 286, at 843. 
288. 25 Williston on Contracts, supra note 223, § 67:17 (quoting Carlisle v. 
Carlisle, 77 Ala. 339, 341 (1884)) (emphasis added). Note that the treatise 
included a determination that specific performance will create a hardship or 
give rise to an injustice. 
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not a discretion in the sense that it may be granted or denied at the 
will or pleasure of the judge. It is governed by the elements, conditions, 
and incidents that control the administration of all equitable rem-
edies.”289 
Another objection, which hopefully is already adequately addressed 
by this Article, is that the FAA is intended to mandate action by courts 
and that maintenance of discretion would be inconsistent with that in-
tent. As discussed, the FAA was not intended to restrict courts, but to 
empower them,290 and the “mandatory” language of Section 2 has sim-
ply been misread.291 Given that judicial discretion in granting specific 
enforcement was firmly in place when the FAA was drafted Congress 
would presumably have clearly indicated an attempt to curtail such 
discretion. There is nothing in the FAA that indicates that the statute 
was designed to strip the courts of the ability to make these equitable 
determinations. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Kulukundis 
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.292 observed in dicta in its 1942 
opinion that: 
It may well be that in a proceeding under Section 4 [of the FAA], 
there are open many of the usual defenses available in a suit for 
specific performance. It would seem that a court, when exercising 
equity powers, should do so on the basis of a fully informed 
judgment as to all the circumstances. We recognize that some 
authorities have held to the contrary under similarly worded state 
arbitration statutes, interpreting them to require the courts 
automatically to decree specific performance without regard to 
the usual equitable considerations. It is difficult for us to believe 
that Congress intended us so to construe Section 4, although we 
do not here decide that question.293 
We do trust courts to exercise their discretion for all other types of con-
tracts and given that judicial hostility had largely subsided by the time 
Congress passed the FAA, there seems little reason not to trust them 
with arbitration. 
To the extent there is some hesitation to opening up arbitration 
provisions to the full panoply of equitable considerations—even the 
 
289. Tierney v. Four H Land Co., 852 N.W.2d 292, 301 (Neb. 2014) (quoting 
Mainelli v. Neuhaus, 59 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Neb. 1953)). 
290. See supra Part III.B. 
291. See supra Part III.C. 
292. 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942). 
293. Id. at 987. The court did state that it did not believe those considerations 
applied to a Section 3 stay. Id. Yet, the stay is really nothing more than an 
injunction against pursuing a cause of action and should be subject to the 
same considerations. 
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Kulukundis Shipping court spoke of only “many,” and not “all,” of these 
defenses as being applicable to arbitration provisions—considerations 
relating to hardship and injustice through the loss of a meaningful rem-
edy for other claims have the strongest claim to judicial consideration 
under the FAA. 
As discussed earlier, the heritage of the FAA is all about ensuring 
meaningful—not merely technical or nominal—remedies.294 Arbitration 
provisions were to be made enforceable in a meaningful way alongside 
other types of claims, not instead of them. Second, the language of the 
FAA assumes that when the court stays litigation, the agreed upon ar-
bitration will actually occur.295 Section 3 provides for a stay of litigation 
pending arbitration.296 Presumably, Congress assumed that arbitration 
would serve as a meaningful substitute for litigation and actually occur 
in lieu of the litigation. 
Permitting courts to consider the impact on parties will have other 
positive effects, as well. It will enable parties and the providers of arbi-
tration to innovate to find creative and cost-effective ways to ensure 
that collective arbitration can occur. That is, a ban on class-action arbi-
tration need not be fatal even where small consumer claims are involved 
so long as the arbitration provision provides adequate incentives and 
procedures to ensure that a claim can realistically be brought in 
arbitration instead of in litigation. The procedures do not have to mimic 
class action litigation, but merely need be adequately protective of the 
rights of the parties. 
Conclusion 
Empowering courts to consider the impact of the enforcement of 
arbitration provisions is fully consistent with the FAA. Indeed, ignoring 
such impact amounts to a disregard for the heritage, structure, and lan-
guage of the FAA. The proposal here is relatively modest and should 
be uncontroversial. Courts should be able to consider the impact of en-
forcement of arbitration provisions on the ability of a party to receive 
a meaningful remedy for other claims. The fact that even this basic as-
pect of judicial authority has to be wrested back from the Supreme 
Court shows how far off course we are with our current jurisprudence. 
The proposal in this Article represents an effort to bring the Court back 
to the correct course; one more consistent with the intent of Congress 
in enacting the FAA more than ninety years ago. 
 
 
294. See supra Part I. 
295. As discussed earlier, the FAA provides for a stay of litigation pending 
arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). Presumably, Congress assumed that an 
arbitration claim could be as readily brought as a claim in court. 
296. Id. 
